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CASE NOTES

assist in the presentation of the case was held to be privileged. In State v.
Loponio,13 the defendant, who was unable to write, employed another to
write a letter to his attorney and the communication was held to be privileged. Also, communications made to an attorney in the presence of his
clerk and stenographers do not come within the general rule that communications made in the presence of third persons are not privileged because the use of these agents is indispensable to the attorney's work.
In a situation such as the one here presented, it is definitely necessary to
employ the agency of a physician to interpret the injured person's symptoms and conditions and determine the nature and extent of his injuries.
Without such an examination a person cannot adequately pursue his remedy at law. Insurance companies will not consider the settlement or payment of a claim without a medical report.
Thus, in jurisdictions, such as Illinois, which do not have statutes creating the physician-patient privilege, communications made to a physician
may come within the attorney-client relationship and be privileged as confidential. The attorney-client privilege does not depend on a statute for
its existence as it is one recognized by common law and protected
throughout the United States. It would seem to be a useless right if agents
of the client and the attorney, necessarily employed by them, did not come
within the privilege. It would confuse the client and hamper the ends of
justice if only certain agents of the client or attorney were protected; the
client would be hesitant to entrust any agent with information for fear it
could be brought out in open court to his detriment. Therefore, the mere
fact that a state does not have a statute creating a physician-patient privilege should not prevent communications made to a physician from being
privileged under the attorney-client relationship where it is necessary to
employ such an agent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Plaintiffs sought to enforce racial restrictive covenants against white
sellers and negro purchasers of restricted land. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma ruled that a state court could not enforce racial restrictive
agreements in such a way as to work a forfeiture of land validly purchased
by these restricted parties. However, the court said that a state court could
enforce an action for damages against the defendants because they had
conspired to evade these covenants. Correll v. Early, z37 P. zd 1017
(Okla., 1951).

In Sbelley v. Kraemer,' the landmark case in regard to racial restrictive
13 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 Ad. 1045 (S. Ct., 1913).
1334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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covenants, it was made clear that state action, whether it be executive,
legislative, or judicial, could not deprive racially restricted persons of land
validly purchased by them because such action would be a denial of equal
protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whether state enforcement by means of an action for damages for the
breach of a restrictive covenant would be discriminatory state action and
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment was not decided.
It was specifically pointed out in the Shelley case that in order to bring
such covenants within the scope of the constitutional power of protection,
it must be shown that state action had operated against the excluded party.
As a corollary to this, it was said:
That'Amendment (Fourteenth) erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. We conclude, therefore, that the
of any
restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation
2
rights guaranteed to the petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has construed the above-quoted statements as giving an independent validity to restrictive covenants, a validity
which allows a damage action for their breach to be entertained and enforced by a state court and thus effects a result that the Shelley case by
spirit, though not by expresswords, seeks to abolish. These statements
seem merely to mean that in order to invoke the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a person must prove that the discrimination was
accomplished by state action as distinguished from private action. He must
also show that the state, acting through its judiciary in giving efficacy to
these agreements, is abridging the right to equal protection of the law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Oklahoma court in the instant case agrees that the state is powerless
to cancel a contract, oust the purchaser, or exact other measures which
would work a forfeiture of the restricted land. In regard to the alienation
of restricted land, it is not disputed that restrictive covenants have no legal
effect; once a state attempts to enforce racial restrictive covenants, the
state action, alFourteenth Amendment will effectively prohibit such
3
though a private citizen has petitioned the state to act.
The Shelley case had said, "So long as the purposes of those agreements
are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear
clear, that there had been no action by the state and the provisions of the
Amendment have not been violated." '4 The Oklahoma Court has not over2Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). An illustration of how far the term
"private conduct" can be stretched is found in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. 2d 541 (1949).
RFor state decisions which discuss the Shelley case more fully, see Coleman v.
Stewart, 33 Cal. ,d703, 204 P. 2d 7 (1949); Tovey v. Levy, 4o I l.393, 8z N.E. 2d
441 (1948); Goetz v. Smith, 191 Md. 707, 62 A. ad 6o2 (1948); Rich v. Jones, 14zN.J.
Eq. 215, 59 A. 2d 839 (Ch., 19 4 8).
4 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. i, 13 (1948).
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looked this sentence but it has, perhaps, overlooked the application of the
words "voluntary adherence." It is true that private landowners may, with
impunity, enter into restrictive agreements and they may adhere to them
by refusing to negotiate contracts with persons whom they seek to exclude. The excluded person who attempts to penetrate the barrier has no
effective weapon to accomplish this because there does not now exist an
express constitutional provision or statute which prohibits such voluntary
adherence by private parties. An illustration of this is Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation,5 where the court stated that a private housing
corporation, although created in part by the financial and governmental
aid of the state, was still a private party, and, as such, could not be forced
to admit restricted persons as tenants.
In Correll v. Early,6 racial agreements are held valid, with regard to
damages, merely because private parties may enter into them and adhere
to them with impunity. However, it may be asked how they can ever
become legally binding agreements, subject to the same remedies as other
valid agreements, unless the state enforces them. "Voluntary" implies free
will. By subjecting the covenantor to a civil suit for damages should he
decide to sell to a restricted person, the voluntary agreement is actually
being enforced by state action.
Weiss v. Leaon7 is the only other state court decision determining the
validity of a damage action for the breach of a restrictive racial covenant.
The rationale of that decision, although it followed the Shelley case in
denying injunctive relief or specific performance of the covenants, held
that the agreements had sufficient validity in themselves to warrant an
action for damages for their breach. Not differing materially from the
instant case, the Missouri Supreme Court chose to be bound only to the
specific question presented in the Shelley case and felt free to determine
the question of damages.
Roberts v. Curtis,8 a case arising in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, is opposed to the proposition expressed by the
Missouri and Oklahoma decisions. The federal court held that although
Shelley v. Kraemer9 did not decide this question, the case was broad
enough to include damage actions in the same category _as the enforcement of racial restraints.
Although Shelley v. Kraemer'0 did not determine the constitutionality
of state-enforced damage actions for the breach of racial covenants, such
state action indirectly effects a result that is not in keeping with the underlying spirit of that decision. Until the Supreme Court of the United
5 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. zd 541 (949).
6 237 P. 2d 1017 (Okla., 195i).
359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W. 2d 127 (1949).
8 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.C., i95o).
7

9 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

10Ibid.
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States does determine the constitutional question involved in the present
case and the prior case of Weiss v. Leaon," the problems flowing from
racial restrictive covenants will continue to remain, in part, unsolved.
TORTS-RIGHT OF WIFE'S ADMINISTRATOR TO RECOVER
FROM HUSBAND'S ESTATE UNDER WRONGFUL
DEATH STATUTE
After shooting his wife, a husband then shot and killed himself. The
wife died a few minutes after her husband and was survived by a minor
daughter by a previous marriage. A suit was brought against the executor
of the husband's estate by the administrator of the wife's estate. The trial
court gave judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict of the
jury for the plaintiff. Judgment was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District' but was reversed by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Welch v. Davis, 410 I11. 130, ioi N.E. 2d 547 (I951).
The Appellate Court had based its decision denying recovery on its
construction of the Married Women's Act 2 and the Wrongful Death
Statute3 and held that the Married Women's Act did not give a wife the
right to sue her husband for a personal tort. Therefore, since the wife
could not maintain an action against her husband during her lifetime, her
administrator could not maintain an action for her wrongful death.
The Supreme Court's reversal was based on an interpretation of the
Wrongful Death Statute only. The court reasoned that the statute meant
to create a new cause of action in the next of kin, that the disability of the
wife to sue was personal, that the marriage had been terminated and that,
therefore, there was no reason to extend the inability to the beneficiaries
under the act.
At common law a person was not liable in tort for causing the death of
another.4 A cause of action for personal injuries did not survive the injured party, and there was no action to recover damages caused by the
death of someone else. Recognizing the injustice of the situation, and the
beneficial interests that one party may have in the life of another, legislatures passed what are commonly referred to as Wrongful Death Statutes.
Generally, these statutes give a cause of action to the next of kin of the
deceased if the deceased would have been able to maintain a suit, had
death not ensued.
Such defenses as contributory negligence and self defense, which miti1054, 225 S.W. Ad (949).
' Welch v. Davis, 342 Il. App. 69, 95 N.E. 2d io8 (95o).
Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 68, SS 1-21.
2 111.
3111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 70, S§S , 2.
4 25 C.J.S., Death 5 13 (194t); 16 Am. Jur., Death S44 (1938).

11 359 Mo.

